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COMMENTS
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL
IN PENNSYLVANIA
HISTORY
Processes for the involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill are of
ancient origin. At common law, detention was sanctioned if necessary to
prevent injury to the person or property.' The state's power to au-
thorize such restraint was considered to be an emergency right and:
could be exercised only during the time necessary to obtain
legal authority. In addition, when the question of confinement
came before a judicial officer, the allegedly insane person was
considered simply as too dangerous a person to be at large. He
might be put in jail, a poorhouse, pen, strong room or any se-
cure place.'
Once committed, the inmate was subjected to ignominious and bar-
barous treatment. The nature of the confinement has been characterized
as follows:
The problem of administration, so far as the inmates were con-
cerned, was limited to guarding them and preventing their
escape. Whipping, chaining to the wall or floor; and restraint in
handcuffs, bedharnesses, or in the strait jacket or "madd shirt"
were generally the devices used at the time.'
Since the ultimate effect of mental illness is the inability of the indi-
vidual to adapt within the social milieu,4 the area eventually received
legislative recognition. At its inception legislation was rooted in the
preventive essence of the police power, and was enacted as a prophy-
1. "The right to restrain an insane person against his will without legal authority
existed at common law whenever confinement was necessary to prevent personal or property
damage." Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 1178, 1185 (1947). This student work is well recognized
by writers in the field of mental health.
2. Ibid.
3. Weihofen and Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 24 TEXAs L. REv. 307,
311 (1946).
4. "Whether the illness results from organic causes . . . or is one of the diseases for
which no organic cause can be found, the symptoms of serious mental illness are those
of release, or regression to an uninhibited state. The social controls, including the individual's
inability to work within a complex human relationship, are usually the first to suffer
deterioration. This failure may result in the inability of the individual to care for himself,
or it may be expressed in anti-social conduct directed at others. In either case, the problems
are no longer medical, but have social and legal consequences." Bowman, Presidential Ad-
dress, 103 Am. J. PsycnwATRY, 1, 12 as quoted in Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process In
Commitment Procedures, 57 N.W.L. RFv. 383, 388 (1962).
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lactic measure for the protection of persons and property.5 However, as
psychiatric and psychological techniques became more sophisticated and
possibilities of care and treatment were unveiled, legislation incorporated
therapeutic considerations.' The preventive essence of the police power
was thought insufficient to sustain this absorption, and despite objection,7
justification was eventually founded upon the sovereign's duty to care for
his subjects, i.e., parens patriae.8
Pennsylvania was one of the first to acknowledge the potentiality of
therapy.' In the famous case of Hindman v. Richie, ° judge Burnside
instructed the jury as follows:
If wrong has been done, they (the defendants) are open to the
examination of the civil courts, and the question will be in each
particular case whether the safety of the person himself or that
of his family or friends or neighbors require that he be re-
strained for a time, and whether restraint is necessary for his
restoration or will be conductive thereto. In considering the
question of restraint ... if confinement or restraint with regular
medical treatment are necessary for the restoration of such a
person to a perfectly sane mind, they are the best friends of the
party who enforce it."
The doctrine of parens patriae was echoed in the case of Hammon v.
Hill.2 In upholding the involuntary hospitalization of an individual, the
court stated that "the state restrains the lunatic, not only for his own
protection, and the safety of the public, but its duty extends so far as to
include every provision known to medical skill and science for the treat-
ment of the diseased mind."'"
The therapeutic aspect of commitment has been reflected in Pennsyl-
vania's most recent endeavor to cope with the problem of mental illness;
The Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966
established procedures for the involuntary hospitalization of anyone
believed to be mentally disabled and in need of care. 4
5. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MIcH. L.
REV. 945 (1959).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 50, § 4401 (Supp. 1966).
7. Currans, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N. CAR. L. REV. 274 (1953).
8. Bassiouni, The Right of the Mentally Ill, 15 DEPAUT. L. REV. 291, 300 (1966).
9. Massachusetts was the first state to acknowledge this. Matter of Oakes, 8 Law Rep.
122 (Mass. 1845).
10. Brightly's Reports 143 (1849).
11. Id at 161.
12. 228 F. 999 (1915).
13. Ibid.
14. PA. STAT. ANN. it. 50, § 4401 (Supp. 1966).
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Mental Health Legislation: A
Timely and Challenging Area
The area of mental health constitutes a grave societal problem; it
demands peculiarly unique legislative action. 5 From 1903 to 1953
American hospitals showed a two-fold increase in the ratio of patients
suffering from a mental disorder to the general population.' 6 These statis-
tics assume additional significance after one realizes that they do not in-
clude those who had received extra-mural care or the many whose
"silenced" hospital records conceal the stigma of a mental disability. 7
Recent statistics for Pennsylvania reveal that 54,276 mentally and emo-
tionally disturbed persons were treated in state mental hospitals alone in
the past year."s
State involvement in the area is extensive; governmental institutions
service approximately 97.5% of the nation's mental patients.' 9 For the
past fiscal year, Pennsylvania's financial commitments totaled $88,914,-
757; federal contributions were comparatively small. 0
A statistical survey indicates the magnitude of the problem and high-
lights the demand for legislation; the demand is not easily satisfied how-
ever. The legislative task is a difficult one requiring a delicate reconcilia-
tion of the dictates of due process with the popular insistence on cure and
treatment. The popular demand for treatment has manifested itself
in a deprecation of the requirements of (1) a jury trial, (2) notice, and
(3) the presence of the alleged mentally ill person at a hearing.21 The
extent to which Pennsylvania has deferred to those demands and the con-
stitutionality of such an accommodation is worthy of examination.
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT UNDER THE
PENNSYLVANIA MENTAL HEALTH AND
MENTAL RETARDATION ACT OF 1966
The Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966
has established three procedures for the civil commitment of a person
alleged to be mentally disabled:
15. The legislature must take cognizance of the fact that legal formality may harm the
mentally ill individual, and must try to avoid this while satisfying due process requirements.
Kutner, supra, note 4 at 368.
16. Bourdeau, Mental Health, The New Public Frontier, 286 ANNALS 9 (1953).
17. Id. at 9.
18. Public Welfare Report, 1965-1966 Dept. of Welfare, p. 52 (1966).
19. Currans, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N. CAR. L. REV. 274 (1953).
20. Public Welfare Report, supra, note 18 at p. 7.
21. "Many, especially psychiatrists and the allied profession, have argued over the years
that the introduction of these legal formalities made treatment less accessible and retarded
the development of mental health. Others argued that the introduction of legal principles
into the insanity field was of great importance . . .". Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment
and the Requirements of Due Process, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 28, 34 (1960).
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1. Section 4404 provides that:
a. A written application for commitment to a facility may be
made in the interest of any person who appears to be mentally
ill and in need of care ...
b. Such application shall be accompanied by the certificates of
two physicians who have examined the person whose commit-
ment is sought within one week of the date of the certificates
and who have found, in their opinion, such person to be men-
tally disabled and in need of care...
c. The director may receive the person named in the applica-
tion and detain him until discharge...
d. Every commitment shall be reviewed at least annually.
2. Section 4405 provides for the emergency detention of an individ-
ual:
a. Whenever a person appears by reason of his acts or threat-
ened acts to be so mentally disabled as to be dangerous to him-
self or others and in need of immediate care, he may be taken
into custody for purposes of examination provided that:
1. . •
2. The acts or threats which give cause to believe the person
to be mentally disabled and in need of care are overt, demon-
strate a clear and present danger to self or others and are set
forth in the application.
b. Immediately upon being taken into custody, such person
shall be taken with the approved application of a physician or




f. Any person committed under this section may be detained
for a period of not more than ten days. If during this period, the
director finds that such person requires further care, he may
admit the person on a voluntary commitment or notify the
applicant.., to make further application for such person's com-
mitment under other provisions of this act.
3. Section 4406 provides for the commitment of an individual via
court order:
a. Whenever any person is believed to be mentally disabled
[Vol, 5:487
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and in need of care or treatment by reason of such mental dis-
ability ... , a petition may be presented to the court of common
pleas in the county in which the person resides or is for his
examination or commitment...
2.
3. Said court shall upon consideration of such petition shall:
(i.) issue a warrant requiring that such person be brought
before said court, (ii.) fix a date for a hearing . . . , and
(iii.) notify the parties in interest.
b. If upon examination, it is determined that such person is in
need of care at a facility, the examining physician . . . shall
immediately report to said court which may order the commit-
ment of such person for care and treatment.
While sections 4404 and 4405 mark a complete accommodation to the
popular opposition to traditional safeguards of due process, the civil
court procedure embodies the requirements of notice and presence.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROCEDURES
Any procedure for the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill has
been assailed as a deprivation of due process. 2 Dr. Thomas P. Szaz23
has stated that "I oppose mental hospitalization ...because in a free
society, I do not believe that mental illness is a morally legitimate ground
for the loss of liberty. Only conviction for law breaking is." '24 While such
a view would clearly invalidate the aforementioned procedure, it is devoid
of judicial authority; the law, in the main, has sustained procedures for
the commitment of the mentally ill.
Although the commitment by an application supported by the certifi-
cates of two physicians lacks those constitutional safeguards deemed
rudimentary to the criminal proceeding, ample authority exists to uphold
its constitutionality. An earlier Pennsylvania procedure requiring only a
medically supported affadavit was sustained in Hammon v. Hill.25 Al-
though it is uncertain whether a modern court would adhere without
qualification to the philosophy of that case, more recent decisions in other
jurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of ex parte procedures
22. Dr. Szaz is a controversial psychiatrist, and was early recognized as one of the
bright young men of psychiatry. Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty and the Law,
13 KANSAS L. REV. 59 (1962).
23. Ibid.
24. Szaz, "What People Can and Cannot Do," Harper's Apr. 1964, p. 50.
25. 228 Fed. 999 (1915).
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similar to that provided for in the Pennsylvania Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act of 1966. In 1963, The Supreme Court of Maine
sustained a procedure greatly similar to that established in the Pennsyl-
vania statute.2 6 The salient factor in that decision was the availability of
a prompt review of the detention.27 Perhaps persuaded by the idea that a
prompt review of the detention minimized the possibilities of railroading,
Massachusetts,28 Rhode Island,29 Iowa,"° Arkansas,"' and Indiana"2 have
adopted the rationale.
The saving aspect of prompt review would undoubtedly sustain the
Pennsylvania commitment by application procedure; the recent legisla-
tion makes a judicial review available.3 However, that rationale is by
no means universally accepted.
In Barry v. Hall,34 a federal court struck down a statute which autho-
rized commitment upon an application by the Secretary of the Treasury.
The language of the court was compelling: an individual "is entitled to
his day in court and the right to be heard before he is condemned. No
mere ex parte procedure can affect personal rights.""
Ex parte procedures were also struck down as a deprivation of due
process in State v. Mullinax.3 6 Expressly rejecting the line of cases up-
holding the validity of such procedures, the court states that "the consti-
tutional requirement of due process made notice a prerequisite to any
judgment of insanity, or which otherwise deprived the person of liberty
or property . . ."'I This position has been gaining impetus and has re-
sulted in greater legal and popular opposition to summary commit-
ments. 8 The effect of the position is to void the Pennsylvania provision
for ex parte commitment.
The refusal of the Barry and Mullinax courts to sustain an ex parte
procedure is not an indication that a similar position would be taken with
the procedure established for emergency detention. Dicta in the Barry
case suggests that emergency, temporary detentions would be approved;
26. In Re Opinion of the Justices, 170 A.2d 660 (Maine 1961).
27. Id. at 672. The court stated a commitment proceeding was saved by "a prompt
and effective method for institution of proceedings for release."
28. In Re Dowdle, 160 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897).
29. In Re Croswell, 28 R.I. 137, 66 Atl. 55 (1907).
30. Heath v. Soucek, 240 Ia. 300, 36 N.W.2d 432 (1949).
31. Payne v. Robinson, 190 Ark. 614, 8 S.W.2d 76 (1935).
32. In Re Mast, 217 Ind. 28, 25 N.E.2d 1003 (1940).
33. Habeas corpus is available to an inmate of a mental institution. PA. STAT. ANN. tit
50, § 4426 (Supp. 1966).
34. 98 F.2d 222 (1938).
35. Id. at 230.
36. 269 S. W.2d 72 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
37. Id. at 76.
38. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44
TEXAs L. Rav. 424 (1966).
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"it is settled that the detention for a brief period ...while proper pro-
ceedings are being instituted to determine insanity as a matter of law
is not unlawful. ' 3
9
Whereas, the ex parte procedures established in the act are devoid of
judicial safeguards, the civil court commitment mechanism proffers
greater procedural advantage to the mentally disturbed individual. In
providing for a judicial decree ordering commitment, the legislature has
exempted the provision from the basic objections levied against the ex
parte procedure, i.e., the absence of a hearing prior to detention. The
provision fails to require a jury decision on the question. It is unlikely,
however, that this absence will subject the provision to an invalidating
constitutional objection. The possible adverse effect of a jury hearing on
a mentally disturbed individual and the psychiatric complexities of a
judicial commitment have obviated the demand for a jury trial.4 °
In addition, the absence of a requirement for the assistance of counsel
has been recognized to be of constitutional import. In Dooling v. Over-
holser,41 the court stated:
In construing the provisions (of a commitment procedure) to-
gether, any doubt as to their meaning may be resolved so as to
avoid any question of their failure to meet due process require-
ments ...This leads to a construction ...That at hearings
before the commission, the court or the court and jury, the al-
leged insane person has the right to be represented by counsel
and if not so represented, independently, the court shall appoint
counsel.12
Despite the fact that the Dooling court acknowledged the fact that repre-
sentation by counsel may be required, the right to counsel at a commit-
ment proceeding has received only cursory attention. 3 The non-adversary
character of the proceeding may be a primary reason for this inattention.
THE REALITIES OF AN EX PARTE PROCEDURE
Although there is ample authority to sustain the ex parte procedure
established in the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Act of 1966, the ramifications of that rationale present factors which
should inhibit its adoption. Once an individual is committed, an examina-
tion is required only annually;44 any other release mechanism is contin-
39. 98 F.2d at 230.
40. Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process, 57 N.W.L. REv. 383 (1962).
41. 243 F.2d 825 (1957).
42. Id. at 827.
43. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44
TExAs L. Rev. 424, 425 (1966), states that "it is rare to find even a cursory exposition on
the role and function of legal counsel."
44. See Comment, 5 DUQUESNE L. REV. (1966).
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gent upon the discretion of the director of the hospital, or the patient's
initiative in seeking medical or judicial review.4" Such an arrangement
seems inconsistent with the tenets of a legal system which has generally
insisted that the State and not the individual employ judicial process to
justify a detention. In addition, the successful review of and release
from a mental institution is poor recompense for the time spent in an in-
stitution and for the social stigma which attends such a detention.
The realities of a system which relies on the uncontested opinions of a
medical examiner also renders the ex parte procedure vulnerable to
criticism. The function of a physician in a commitment proceeding has
been characterized as follows:
. . . they (legal tests for commitment) are linguistic devices
which in part designate and in part explain deviant forms of be-
havior. They imply that the deviant behavioral events can be
explained as the result of a deficient judgment as the layman
(and legal test) would say, or as the result of poor ego or super-
ego functioning as the psychiatrist would say. The psychiatrist's
testimony, therefore, serves the purpose of presenting scientific
jargon which gives the appearance of being facts about causes,
but which are actually explanations which serve to justify the
legal fact of commitment.4 6
The role of the psychiatrist is then tantamount to that of a judge and
jury; he gathers basic facts from which he concludes that commitment
is required. Scientifically, he proposes no true element of causality, and
therefore performs a function which could be executed by a judicial
officer. Thus, the ex parte procedure assumes a character of an unneces-
sary delegation of a judicial prerogative-the power to deprive an indi-
vidual of his liberty.
The physician's exercise of the power to restrain an individual casts
further doubt upon the wisdom and validity of the delegation. The
vitality of any fact finding procedure depends upon its ability to arrive
at the truth. This essential does not inhere in a procedure which has
authorized the unfettered conclusion of a physician to constitute grounds
for the hospitalization of an individual. Statistics indicate that confine-
ment is recommended in 77% of the cases brought before a physician,
and that papers authorizing hospitalization are signed as a matter of
course.48 Instead of acting as an objective appraiser of fact, "the physi-
45. Ibid.
46. Leifer, The Competence oj the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of In-
sanity: A Skeptical Analysis, 14 SYRA. L. REv. 564, 569 (1963).
47. Application of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).




cian acts as the so-called patient's adversary. Sometimes he represents
the family, sometimes the court, but never the individual suspected of
mental illness."49 Thus, it is submitted that the inability of the ex parte
procedure to arrive at objective conclusions of fact saps it of any vitality
as a legitimate vehicle for effecting commitment.
CONCLUSION
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the order of
a civil proceeding which resulted in the detention of a juvenile.' Speaking
for the majority, Justice Fortas stated that:
... It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited prac-
tical meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is
called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that,
however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "indus-
trial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in
which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His
world becomes a "building with whitewashed walls, regimented
1151routine and institutional laws ....
In striking down the procedure used to effectuate the detention, Justice
Fortas stated that the methods used by the presiding judge were com-
parable to those employed in the criminal case, and that a "kangaroo
court" could not be utilized to deprive an individual of liberty. 2 The
court also emphasized that the realities of juvenile penal administration
necessitated that the individual be better protected, and thus penetrated
the facade of a "civil procedure."5
Analogously, the reality of the ex parte procedure, i.e., the inability of
a physician to function as an objective appraiser of fact, should result
in a judicial repudiation of ex parte commitments. It is submitted that
any procedure which authorized the involuntary hospitalization of an
individual should contain some mechanism which would enable the court
to examine the basic facts upon which the medical determination of
mental disability has been made. Such an examination could be made by
the judge, but it is suggested that counsel is better suited to function in
such a role, and thereby enable the judge to maintain an objective status.
Regardless of the inquisitor's office, however, cross-examination of the
physician would insure that commitment was ordered not as a matter of
convenience or course.
John R. McGinley
49. SZAZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, 74 (1965).
50. Application of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
51. Id. at 1443.
52. Id. at 1445.
53. Ibid.
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